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STRUKTUR EKUITI, PENCARIAN SEWA DAN PRESTASI: BUKTI 
DARIPADA SEKTOR PEMBUATAN DI MALAYSIA (1994 - 2000) 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Tesis ini mengkaji hubungkait antara struktur ekuiti dan nilai firma. Terdapat tiga 
objektif dalam kajian ini. Objektif pertama dan kedua bertujuan untuk menilai samada 
pengurusan firma (konflik agensi I) dan pemegang saham terbesar (konflik agensi II) 
menggunakan leveraj dan diversifikasi untuk melindungi kepentingan peribadi, 
terutamanya dalam keadaan wujudnya peluang pencarian sewa ekonomi. Objektif 
yang ketiga bertujuan mengkaji faktor-faktor yang menentukan pembentukan struktur 
ekuiti di negara ini.  
 
Kajian ini mengambil kira teori perlindungan sewa (rent protection theory), teori 
urusan kos ekonomi (transaction cost economics) dan teori agensi (agency theory) 
dalam satu model.  Dari segi operasi, kajian ini mengkaji hubungan interaksi antara 
struktur ekuiti, leveraj dan diversifikasi berdasarkan keadaaan persekitaran pencarian 
sewa, yakni aset intangible dan struktur persaingan industri terhadap nilai firma.  Kesan 
ini dimantau dalam keadaan terwujudnya pemegang saham terbesar sebagai ahli 
lembaga pengarah dan juga bukan sebagai ahli lembaga pengarah.  
     
Sample kajian ini merangkumi 256 firma perkilangan yang disenaraikan di 
Bursa Saham Malaysia dan meliputi tahun 1994 ke tahun 2000. Hasil kajian utama 
menunjukkan mekanisasi insentif pengalihan mampu mengurangkan konflik agensi. 
Namun demikian, leveraj boleh megurangkan kesan “entrenchment” pada tahap ekuiti 
pemegangan saham yang rendah. Ini  menunjukan terdapat peranan institusi 
kewangan dalam pemantauan firma.  Kajian ini juga menunjukkan pada tahap 
pemegangan saham yang rendah,  diversifikasi mampu mengurangkan kos transaksi 
 x
dan meningkatkan nilai firma seperti yang dicadangkan dalam teori urusan kos 
ekonomi.    
Sebaliknya, apabila kuasa pemegang saham meningkat, mereka didapati 
menggunakan leveraj dan diversifikasi dan menyebabkan kemerosotan nilai firma.  
Dalam industri di mana persaingan adalah rendah, tidak mengira jumlah penguasaan 
ekuiti saham mereka, pemegang saham utama telah menggunakan leveraj dan 
diversifikasi untuk tujuan peribadi mereka. Di firma yang mempunyai nilai aset 
intangible yang tinggi, pemegang saham utama turut menggunakan diversifikasi yang 
menyebabkan kemerosotan nilai firma.  Akan tetapi, peranan pemegang saham utama 
luaran dan bukan ahli lembaga pengarah adalah pasif dalam pemantauan firma dan 
tidak memerungi kemerosotan nilai firma di firma yang berdiversifikasi.    
 
Kajian seterusnya juga menunjukkan firma yang berkaitan dengan kerajaan 
telah menggunakan leveraj yang tinggi jika dibandingkan dengan identiti yang lain. 
Selain daripada firma yang dikuasai oleh sesuatu keluarga, kumpulan konglomerate, 
lebaran dan kerajaan telah menggunakan diversifikasi untuk meningkatkan faedah 
peribadi dan seterusnya menyebabkan kemerosotan dalam nilai firma.  
   
Dalam menilai objektif ketiga, hasil kajian juga mengesahkan pencarian sewa 
kerana leveraj dan struktur industri mempengaruhi ketumpuan pemegangan saham 
secara positif.  Sebaliknya, struktur ekuiti di ekonomi ini tidak sejajar dengan teori 
firma. Hasil kajian mendapati risiko firma dan masalah ketidaksinambungan maklumat 
tidak sejajar dengan struktur ekuiti. Ini menerangkan ketidakupayaan pemegang 
saham untuk memantau firma di negara ini.   
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OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, RENT SEEKING AND PERFORMANCE: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE MALAYSIAN MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
 (1994 - 2000)  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study addresses the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
value. There are three objectives in the study. The first and second objectives of the 
study is to examine whether managers (Type I agency conflicts) and controlling large 
shareholders (Type II agency conflicts) apply excessive leverage and diversification to 
enhance their private controlling interest, in particular in a rent seeking prevalent 
environment. The third objective is to examine factors that determine the formation of 
ownership structures in Malaysia.  
 
The study takes a step forward by including the argument of agency theory, rent 
seeking theory and transaction costs economics in a singular framework. In operating 
terms, this study examines the interaction effects of ownership structure and leverage 
and diversification contingent on rent seeking environments, intangible assets and 
industrial competition on firms’ value. The effects are observed under the presence of 
the largest shareholder as director and as external shareholder.  
 
 A panel of 256 unbalanced Malaysian manufacturing firms over the years 1994 
to 2000 periods was used.  The findings suggest that Type I and Type II agency 
conflicts could be mitigated through the incentive alignment mechanism. In addition, the 
role of leverage to reduce entrenchment effect is found to be effective at the low level 
of a large shareholder’s controlling interest, suggesting the role of financial institutions 
in exerting governance.  Similarly, at this low level, diversification is found to enhance 
firm value, confirming diversification is able to reduce transaction costs in the firms as 
suggested in transaction cost economics.  
 xii
 
On the other hand, the study shows that leverage and diversification are 
mechanisms that are able to expropriate shareholder value when the controlling 
interest is relatively large.  Irrespective of the large shareholder’s controlling interest, 
both expropriation through debt and diversification are found to be prevalent in 
industries with low intensity of competition. In addition, large shareholders also pursue 
diversification in firms with high intangible assets which lead to a lower performance. 
The role of the external large shareholder in corporate governance in this economy is 
however passive and leads to poor performance especially in multiple segment firms.  
 
Controlling for ownership identities, state controlled firms are found to pursue 
rent seeking through excessive debt financing. With the exception of family controlled 
firms, other ownership identities, conglomerate, dispersed and state controlled firms 
are found to diversify in order to further enhance their private interest, especially in rent 
seeking prevalent environment.  
 
In addressing the third objective, the findings suggest that large shareholders 
are pursuing rent seeking interest and positively associated with leverage and less 
competitive industries. In contrast, ownership structures in this economy do not appear 
to be conformed well to the theory of the firm. The risks and information asymmetric 
problems are not minimized due to mismatch ownership structure. These findings 
explain lack of governance by the existing ownership structures in the firms in 
Malaysia.          
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background  
 
The essential issue in ownership structure of modern corporations is the 
problem of ownership of firms by shareholders (principals) which are controlled by 
managers (agents). The study and understanding of ownership structure is crucial for 
at least two main reasons. First, it influences the allocation of capital efficiency in an 
economy. Second, it contains a certain degree of required discipline on managers who 
run the firm on behalf of public shareholders. Both these reasons are significant as 
these influence firm competitiveness in the market. The first reason implies that the 
effective firms elicit the cheapest cost of capital from the capital market to enhance 
their sustainability and growth, while the second reason necessitates firms to operate 
fairly and efficiently so that capital providers obtain the gains. 
 
The importance of ownership structure is further emphasized by Porter (1990). 
He conceded that the competitive advantage of a nation comes from firms instead of 
the nation. Ownership structure is an important variable that could not be neglected. 
This is reflected when he professed,  
 
“Company goals are most strongly determined by ownership structure, 
the motivation of owners and holders of debt, the nature of corporate 
governance, and the incentive processes that shape the motivation of senior 
managers. The goals of publicly held corporations reflect the characteristics of 
that nation’s capital market”        (Porter, 1990 p110) 
 
The underlying problem in ownership structure lies with agency conflicts. An 
agency conflict arises when shareholders (principals) yearn for capital return but 
managers (agents) misappropriate shareholders’ investment (Jensen and Meckling, 
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1976). This creates agency costs as agency decision may diverge from the objective of 
maximization of the welfare of the principal.1   The implications of this misalignment of 
interest between principals and agents can affect a firm’s performance.   
 
Literature often identifies the excessive consumption perquisite by the 
management or controlling owner as the private benefits of control (see surveys’ of 
Short, 1994; Denis and McConnell, 2003). These unscrupulous activities could be 
reduced by increasing managerial equity interests (incentive alignment mechanisms) in 
a firm, so that managerial interest could converge with external shareholders, thereby 
reducing the cost of deviating from value maximisation objectives (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  However, as the managerial interest becomes large, the presence of 
large shareholders can exacerbate the exploitation problem. Shleifer and Vishny (1989; 
1997) asserted that large shareholders could also expropriate shareholder value by 
way of outright theft, sub-optimal diversification and self-dealing through the purchase 
or sale of assets at prices that deviate from their fair value. The level of appropriation 
could be higher if the controlling owner is also involved in the management or as 
director in a company (Short, Keasey and Duxbury, 2002). It is especially prevalent in 
the economies where minority interest protection is low (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer, 1998; 1999).  
 
These two perspectives have drawn numerous researchers to examine the 
relationship between ownership structure and performance. Pedersen and Thomsen 
(2003) classified agency conflicts in Anglo-Saxon countries (i.e. the U.S. and the U.K.) 
as Type I, the basic conflict of interests between widely dispersed weak shareholders 
and strong managers. The Type I agency conflicts follow Berle and Means’ (1932) 
conceptualisation of the US dispersed structure which emphasises the maximisation of 
shareholder value.  However, dispersedly held ownership structures are less common 
                                                          
1Jensen and Meckling (1976, p308) delineate agency costs as the sum of (i) the cost of creating and 
structuring contracts between the principal and agent, (ii) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, (iii) 
the bonding expenditures by the agent and (iv) the residual loss.    
 3
in other countries.  Agency conflicts in European and East Asian countries are held as 
Type II, the basic conflict between controlling large shareholders and weak minority 
shareholders. The classifications show that ownership structures vary according to their 
economic systems and other institutional backgrounds. The empirical findings on the 
relationship between ownership structure and performance, either Type I conflicts or 
Type II conflicts agency problem are also found to be inconsistent and vary across 
countries (Denis and McConnell, 2003).   
 
Critics attribute this inconsistency in findings to the isolation of agency theory 
from other institutional factors (Blair, 1995). Gugler (2001) in reviewing various 
ownership structures across ten different countries concluded that relying on a few 
tools to solve agency conflicts is not optimal as all constellation of ownership and 
control structures involve costs and benefits. He postulated that the trade off 
(complementary or substitution) of one governance mechanism over another yields a 
better solution than relying solely on one device.  
 
In this perspective, literature on the Anglo-Saxon model shows that managers 
or controlling shareholders choose other governance mechanisms such as equity 
ownership, corporate dividend, and leverage policies to minimise agency conflicts. 
Chen and Steiner (1999) observed evidence of debt and dividend could substitute 
managerial ownership as corporate governance mechanisms. A similar findings were 
also shown in Crutchley and Hansen (1989) and Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992).  
These factors are able to complement each other as governance mechanisms, 
especially in countries with fully developed financial systems.    
 
In contrast, in a weak institutional environment, the other governance 
mechanisms such as leverage not only could increase managers’ or controlling 
shareholders’ private interest, but accelerate the problem of agency conflicts. Private 
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interest of control arises when managers or controlling owners take advantage of their 
privileged position for private gains, which are not shared with other shareholders 
(Denis and McConnell, 2003). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) also manifested that 
controlling owners enhance their private interest by engaging in non-value 
maximization activities.  For instance, controlling owners could use leverage (Faccio, 
Lang and Young, 2003) and diversification (Claessens, Djankov, Fan et al, 2003a) to 
facilitate entrenchment or expropriation in firms in East Asian economies. Studies also 
showed that firms with ownership structures prone to the expropriation problem have a 
lower firm value and lower operating efficiency ( Claessens, Djankov, Fan et al, 2002).  
 
The effectiveness of other governance mechanisms is different across countries 
(Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998). It is also dependent upon the type of economic 
activities such as market competition and type of assets (Thomsen and Pedersen, 
2000).  However, Jensen and Meckling (1976) maintain that product and factor market 
competition are unrelated to managerial discretion. It is because owners of a firm with 
monopoly power have the same incentives to limit divergences of the managers from 
value maximisation, as do the owners of competitive firms.   
 
Williamson (1988) postulated that transaction cost economics (TCE) could 
complement agency theory as governance mechanism. 2  Williamson’s (1988) TCE 
claims governance structure can be matched to transaction in a manner that leads to a 
lower cost of exchange. TCE also cites “opportunist” as the cause of misappropriation 
in a firm. Firms that are opportunism and do not adopt cost-minimising governance 
mechanisms would presumably be less efficient and, in the long run, would be 
replaced.  This notion also paves the way for discussing determinants of ownership 
structure from a wider perspective, such as, industrial competition, industrial growth, 
                                                          
2 The TCE argues that ownership structure is consisting of transaction costs which consists of costs of 
ownership (CO) and costs of market contracting (CC). The residual rights of control can be assigned to 
another patron so as to minimize the transaction costs. The type of ownership is determined when 
transaction costs is minimised.  
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profit volatility and others (Thomsen and Pedersen, 1996). For instance, in a highly 
competitive industry, market competition may alleviate the agency problem between 
controlling owners and principals. In this perspective, market competition forces firms to 
operate efficiently and competitively, and reduces the transaction costs of monitoring 
by the principals. Thus, in a highly competitive industry, a higher concentrated 
ownership firm is still sustainable despite a higher information asymmetric problem 
between principals and agents (Thomsen and Pedersen, 1998). Ceteris paribus, in a 
highly concentrated industry, a dispersed ownership structure with a large number of 
shareholders could reduce information asymmetric problem in a firm (Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 1996). 
  
Bebchuk (1999) based on the Williamson’s (1988) transaction cost economics 
argument, proposed that ownership structures follow a rent seeking path in an 
economy. The rent protection theory suggests that the size of private benefits of control 
influence the choice of an ownership structure. The controlling owner tends to protect 
his controlling interest in a rent-interest prevailing environment. A rent-interest 
prevailing environment is defined as an environment that could provide private benefits 
and additional income than the minimum that a person could have earned (Bebchuk, 
1999). A rent interest prevailing environment could be from a less competitive industry 
as well as from a firm’s size.   Bebchuk and Roe (1999) suggested that a large firm’s 
size in a less competitive industry provides rent seeking opportunities for controlling 
owners.  Instead of using leverage as governance mechanism, in the rent seeking 
opportunities prevailing environment, controlling owners could use leverage to finance 
investments instead of equity financing so that their relative equity interest in a firm is 
not threatened. Bebchuk and Roe (1999) also demonstrated that ownership structure is 
positively related to low intensity of industrial competition, signifying that a controlling 
owner’s interest is associated with rent seeking prevalent environment.  Eventually, 
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these misalignments of mechanisms and resources will increase the cost of transaction 
and impede the firm’s value.   
 
In addition, Williamson (1988) suggested the right matching of financing 
structure to lower costs of exchange, which is however subjected to the level of asset 
specificity. A firm with high asset specificity (technology and research and development 
activities) faces great uncertainty and severe information asymmetric problems which 
should be better financed with equity financing.  By incurring debt financing, it can 
increase the  chance of misappropriation by the controlling shareholders by virtue that 
debt holders have little control over the managerial action in ensuring resources are 
utilised efficiently (Jensen, Solberg and Zorn, 1992).        
 
Stein (2003) argued from the TCE’s perspective, diversification can be a 
substitute for an inefficient external capital market, and thereby reduce costs of capital. 
In this regards, diversification strategies help firms allocate capital effectively, 
especially in a capital inefficient economy (Martin and Sayrak, 2003). Stein (2003) 
showed theoretically that diversified firms could face fewer obstacles in accessing 
external capital when compared to single segment firms. This is due to diversification 
eliminating information asymmetric problems between managers and external 
shareholders when funds could be raised from other divisions at a cheaper rate than 
funds from external capital markets. Thus, a diversification firm could lead to a better 
performance. This is in sharp contrast to the agency theory argument where 
diversification is purportedly meant to further enhance controlling owners’ private 
interests in a firm. In this regards, Khanna and Palepu (1997; 2000) showed that the 
benefits of diversification overwhelm agency conflicts in multiple segment firms in India. 
 
Nonetheless, studies involving direct inter relationships between ownership 
structure and other governance mechanisms which subsequently affect performance 
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are still limited (Gugler, 2001). Most studies focus on the incentive alignment 
mechanism when addressing the relationship between ownership structure and 
performance. There is limited literature that deals explicitly with other arguments such 
as private interest of control, asset specificity and the industrial competition argument in 
a singular framework.  Furthermore, most research has concentrated on the Anglo-
Saxon governance regime characterised by a well developed capital market.   
 
In the case of Malaysia, as in most developing economies, some of the control 
devices may not work as well as in countries with fully developed financial systems. 
Malaysia provides a number of characteristics that make it particularly suited to the 
investigation of the relationship between ownership structure and performance based 
on the framework of agency theory, rent seeking path theory and transaction costs 
economic arguments.  The following section highlights some problem statements that 
lead to the study in this thesis.  
 
1.2 Problem Statements  
  
  Less attention had been given to the Malaysian corporate ownership until the 
recent financial crisis where firms’ moral hazard and weak governance were highlighted 
as two of the factors for firm failure (Dickinson 2000).  Claessens, Djankov and Lang 
(1998a) reported the financing patterns in the pre-crisis period in East Asian 
economies. They highlighted that during the 1990s, the average investment and 
leverage (Debt over Asset) in Malaysia showed an increasing trend, 10.7% and 
0.908%, respectively. However,  Return on Asset (ROA) had shown a declining trend 
during the same period. Moreover, the percentage of short-term loans in domestic 
borrowing and foreign borrowing for the year 1996 in Malaysia was higher than that in 
other East Asian countries. The financing and investment patterns during the pre-crisis 
period revealed that investment and financing were not determined according to value 
maximisation principles. Claessens, Djankov, Fan et al (2003b) also elucidated that 
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firms in Malaysia pursue misallocation of capital diversification.  It is therefore 
interesting to know whether managers and controlling shareholders were accused, for 
purportedly being involved in unscrupulous decisions in debt financing and 
diversification, which subsequently lead to a poorer performance. Furthermore, finance 
literature documents that debt financing could further enhance performance, whilst 
diversification in a weak external capital market could reduce cost of financing, thereby 
improving firm performance (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; 2000). The chances of 
misappropriation through debt and diversification could be caused by rent seeking 
factors in financial sector and highly concentrated industries that enhance financial rent 
and industrial rent in Malaysia. These rents benefit managers and controlling owners 
as it allows additional income than the minimum that they would have accepted.  
 
 Malaysia provides the opportunity to study the influence of rent seeking factors.  
The following first and second statements highlight that Malaysia provides a rent 
seeking opportunities environment through a financial restraint policy and highly 
protected industrial policy. The third issue emphasises the problem involving the issues 
of the diversification in Malaysia and lastly, the shortfall of the studies on agency 
problem in Malaysia is highlighted.  
 
First, the high debt ratio prior to the financial crisis period is always suggested 
as the factor that led to a lower firm value in the economy. The studies are also not 
concrete in explaining high debt ratio in this economy. For instance, Deesomsak, 
Paudyal and Pescetto (2004) cross sectional studies (Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore 
and Australia) showed that firms established a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and leverage for the sample period from 1993 to 2001. However, the 
positive relationship between debt and the controlling owner did not seem to be 
consistent with other single nation studies. In Thailand, large shareholders were found 
to negatively explain debt ratios for the sample period of 1996 (Wiwattanakantang, 
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1999). Suto (2003) showed that top ten shareholdings in Malaysia were negatively 
related to debt ratio for each cross-sectional year study from 1995 to 1999. Pandey 
(2002) also noted a similar negative relationship between debt ratio and number of 
outstanding shares for the study for the sample period from 1994 to 2000. It is 
assumed that a larger number of shares imply diffused ownership. The inconsistencies 
in the findings show that there are gaps in the study of ownership structure and 
leverage. Nonetheless, the above studies do not assess the direct impact of the 
relationship between ownership structure and debt towards firm value.  One possible 
answer to the high debt in the economy could be due to Bebchuk’s (1999) rent seeking 
theory, where the insiders or controlling owners have intentionally increased debt to 
enhance their private interest in environments with higher rent seeking opportunities, 
which is subsequently leading to reducing firm value. However, it is a priori uncertain 
on this particular issue in this economy.   
 
An alternative explanation to the issue of high leverage is resorting to “financial 
restraint policy” advocated by Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (1996). The policy 
suggests that financial institutions in East Asian economies are more inclined to lend.  
The financial restraint policy aims at promoting overall economic growth through 
lending at a lower interest rate with higher volume of loans. The policy creates 
“financial rent” benefits (excess profit opportunities) which are the incentives for firms 
and financial institutions to borrow and prudently monitor their client firms, respectively.  
The “financial rent” could also provide the opportunities to the insiders and controlling 
owners to incur higher leverage so as to enhance their controlling interests, which 
could lead to a lower firm value. On the other hand, if the financial restraint policy is 
effective, we may observe a higher firm value as financial institutions govern the firms.  
If the financial restraint policy is effective, a higher leverage could lead to a higher firm 
value as financial institutions govern their loan portfolio which they lend their loans to. 
Nonetheless, FIs in Malaysia are largely relationship based and are not effective in 
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monitoring firms (Section 2.4.1 provides the details). Moreover, the issue of agency 
problem could overwhelm the financial restraint policy, where rent seeking by insiders 
and controlling owner lead to a higher leverage and causes moral hazard to firms.   
 
Second, the state is in favour of the protectionism policy to develop industries 
in the economy. A study by Bhattacharya (2002) showed that the mean of industrial 
concentration ratio in Malaysia was 0.55 in 1996, and only 31% of the manufacturing 
industries appeared to be competitive. In this regard, controlling owners in low 
competition intensity industries are more inclined to extravagance in their daily 
operations. Moreover, the average debt financing in the Malaysian manufacturing 
sector  was on the average 72.67%, of which 97% was contributed  by the banking 
system in the economy for the period from 1994 to 1996 (Malaysia, 1996). Following 
the argument of Bebchuk and Roe’s (1999), a less competitive industry creates 
industrial rent which could lead to managerial slacks and poor discretions in decisions. 
The managers can avoid monitoring from external capital providers due to self 
sufficient profits internally in a highly concentrated industry (Roe, 2001). Therefore, in 
this economy, we are uncertain whether managers and controlling owners intentionally 
pursue higher debt financing to protect their private interest especially in industries with 
low intensity of competition where rent seeking opportunities are prevalent.  
 
Third,  Claessens, Djankov, Fan et al, (2003b) showed  that approximately 70% 
of the Malaysian firms pursue the diversification policy. Their findings also indicate that 
diversification in Malaysia was carried out for the purpose of misallocation of capital. 
The values of diversified firms were found to be lower in the short term as well as long 
term. Debt financing in Malaysia was also positively related to the investment in the 
1990s (Suto, 2003).  Nonetheless, there are no empirical works offered on whether 
debt financing and the level of diversification is related to managers and controlling 
owners to enhance their private interest.  On the other hand, the literature related to 
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diversification also argues that diversification can substitute for an inefficient external 
capital market, and lead to a cheaper and efficient internal capital markets (Stein, 
2003). However, the purposes of firms pursuing diversification are uncertain in this 
economy. A manager or controlling owner may pursue diversification strategy to 
overcome a weak internal capital market.  We are also uncertain that a manager or 
controlling owner pursues diversification in this economy especially in an environment 
where rent seeking opportunities is prevailing so as to protect their private interests.    
 
Fourth, the knowledge and understanding of ownership structure in Malaysia is 
not well established. An earlier study by Lim (1981) focused on the formation of 
ownership structure of the one hundred largest firms during the 1970s. Ling (1982), on 
the other hand, assessed the distribution of ownership structure from the social 
economic and income distribution perspectives.  Both studies indicate that the 
determinants of ownership structure in Malaysia are driven by socio-economic factors.  
The intervention from the state to reallocate equity among different races has 
transformed the determinants of ownership structure in the country (Chapter 2 provides 
the discussion).   
 
Ownership structure in Malaysia is characterized as highly concentrated. For 
instance, La Porta, De Silanes and Shleifer (1999) showed that the top three largest 
shareholders hold 46% of the voting stock in the 10 largest firms. It is generally argued 
that the tendency for large shareholders to extract private benefits increases in tandem 
with their controlling interest (Barclay and Holderness, 1989; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan et al, 1999; Lemmon and Lins, 2003).  The studies by Noor, 
Said and Redzuan (1999) and Ali (2001), on the other hand, focused on the issue of 
agency conflicts. Both studies conclude that firm performance follows a non-linear 
inverted U relationship with insider ownership, confirming that as insider equity interest 
in the firms becomes large, the firms are prone to expropriation. However, despite of 
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the presence of large shareholder in the Malaysian firms,  both studies assumed the 
incentive alignment mechanism argument (Type I agency conflicts) and did not 
controlled for the presence of large shareholders as director or as external shareholder 
(Type II agency conflicts) which could either function as internal governance 
mechanism or could accelerate the expropriation on firm value.   
 
These issues generate some questions that need to be addressed. Do 
managers and controlling owners pursue excessive leverage and diversification in a 
rent-seeking prevalent environment in Malaysia? What are the roles of the large 
shareholders?  In addition to industrial rent and financial rent addressed above, asset 
specificity could also provide opportunities for managers or controlling owners to 
enhance their private interest through debt and diversification. This issue has not been 
addressed in this economy. In order to address these questions, the study has taken a 
more comprehensive approach to encompass agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), rent seeking path theory (Bebchuk, 1999) and the argument of transaction cost 
economics (Williamson, 1988) in a singular framework. It also assesses the influence of 
large shareholders on directors.  
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study  
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the conditions under which 
managers, owners’ involvement as directors or external shareholders pursue rent 
seeking objectives. The objectives of the study are:  
(i) To examine whether managers (Type I agency conflicts) and  
controlling large shareholders  (Type II agency conflicts) apply 
excessive leverage to entrench or expropriate firms’ value in firms 
with highly intangible assets and industries with low intensity of 
competition. 
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(ii) To examine whether managers (Type I agency conflicts) and  
controlling large shareholders  (Type II agency conflicts) apply  
diversification to entrench or expropriate firms’ value in firms with 
highly intangible assets and industries with low intensity of 
competition. 
(iii) To evaluate the determinants of ownership structures.     
 
 
1.4 Summary of the Hypotheses 
 
Three sets of hypotheses are developed in the thesis. The hypotheses address 
Type I agency conflicts- between external shareholders and managers, and Type II 
agency conflicts- between large shareholders and minority shareholders.  All else being 
equal, incentive alignment may reduce agency costs as suggested in Jensen and 
Meckling (1976).  However, by incurring higher debt, managers could reduce the 
entrenchment effect, as debt could function as a governance mechanism and improve 
firm value. Nonetheless, the rent seeking theory suggests that the incentive for 
controlling managers to use debt to protect their interest increases in correspondence 
to their equity interest, this leads to a declining firm value. The issues involves Type I 
agency conflicts are further examined in firms with highly intangible assets and highly 
concentrated industry.  Therefore,        
H1a: In Type I agency conflicts, interaction effects between insider ownership 
and higher leverage on firm value follow a non-linear inverted U relationship.  
H1b:  In Type I agency conflicts, the utilization of higher leverage in firms with 
high intangible assets leads to a lower firm value    
H1c: In Type I agency conflicts, the utilization of higher leverage in industries 
with low intensity of competition leads to a lower firm value.   
 
In Type II agency conflicts, the agency conflicts and rent seeking is viewed to 
be more severe and could lead to a decline in firm value.  
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H1d: In Type II agency conflicts, the utilization of higher leverage, with the 
presence of the relatively large shareholder as director, leads to deterioration in 
firm value.  
H1e: In Type II agency conflicts, the utilization of higher leverage, with the 
presence of large external shareholders, leads to deterioration in firm value. 
H1f:  In Type II agency conflicts, the utilization of higher leverage in the firm with 
high intangible assets leads to a lower firm value.  
H1g: In Type II agency conflicts, the utilization of higher leverage in industries 
with low intensity of competition leads to a lower firm value.     
 
The second group of hypotheses argue that diversification by managers (Type I 
agency conflicts) follow the incentive alignment argument.  Large shareholders, due to 
their larger stake in a firm could build upon diversification but at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Type II agency conflicts). Diversification in a highly concentrated industry 
is deemed as unnecessary.  Moreover, agency conflicts could lead to high 
diversification in highly concentrated industries. In a firm with intangible assets, 
diversification could reduce information asymmetric problems and transaction costs in 
the firm and therefore enhance firms’ performance. However, the presence of Type I 
and Type II agency conflicts, could lead to deterioration in firm value.     
 
H2a: In Type I agency conflicts, interaction effects between insider ownership 
and diversification on firm value follow a U –shape relationship.  
H2b: In Type II agency conflicts, the interaction term between relatively large 
shareholders and diversification could lead to decline in firm value.   
H2c,: In  Type II agency conflicts, the interaction term between relatively large 
shareholders and diversification in industries with lower intensity of competition 
could lead to a deterioration in firm value,  
H2d: In Type I and Type II agency conflicts, the interaction effects between 
ownership and diversification in firms with high intangible assets could lead to 
deterioration in firm value.   
      
The last group of hypotheses built upon ownership concentrations are subject to 
rent seeking theory (Bebcuk, 1999) and the nature of the firm theory (Putterman,  
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1993). According to rent seeking theory, a controlling owner may increase leverage to 
enhance their private interest. However, as their controlling interest increases, the 
controlling owner will have incentives to decrease debt levels.   The controlling interest 
is also expected to increase correspondingly to the degree of industrial concentration.  
In this regard, the controlling owner could use diversification to enhance his interest in 
an industry with low intensity of competition.  Lastly, there are possibilities that large 
shareholders extract their private interest in firms with high intangible assets due to the 
problem of information asymmetry. The significant findings from the below hypotheses 
will further confirm that ownership structures in this economy are pursuing rent seeking 
interest. Therefore,   
H3a: There is a non-linear inverted U relationship between ownership 
concentration and leverage in a firm.   
H3b: There is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and 
industries with lower intensity of competition.  
H3c: Ownership concentration is positively related to higher levels of 
diversification.  
H3d: Ownership concentration is positively associated with interaction effects of 
diversification and industries with less intensity of competition 
H3e: Ownership concentration is positively associated with the firms with 
intangible assets.  
 
Based on the nature of the firm theory (Putterman, 1993), which suggests 
information asymmetric problem is more severe in firms with a larger size and cash 
flow, a dispersed ownership structure will reduce the risk among shareholders.  Lastly, 
a large shareholder is associated with higher risk corresponding to their equity interest 
in a firm. This prompts them to be risk averse in business ventures. The significance 
findings will illustrate that ownership structures in this economy function according to 
costs and benefits of the nature of the firm theory. Conversely, it illustrates that 
ownership structures in this economy are inefficient.   The hypotheses suggest that: 
H3f:  Ownership concentration is negatively related to firm size and cash flow.   
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H3g:  Ownership concentration is negatively related to business risk.         
 
1.5 Significance of the Study   
 
The contributions of this study are two- fold. First, the study extends the scope 
in finance literature, especially in the area of corporate governance. The agency theory 
focuses primarily on ex-ante incentive alignment mechanisms. Our study includes ex-
post governance issues such as diversification, industrial competition and firm specific 
assets which are not discussed in agency theory.  Furthermore, the study explores the 
influence of large shareholders on managers.  Thus far, studies which have addressed 
the influence of large shareholders are very limited (Holderness, 2003).  
 
The study also offers an additional perspective to the study of ownership 
structure in an emerging economy. This is vital as researchers have, so far, disagreed 
upon which system of ownership structure is the most efficient. For instance, Roe 
(1994) argued that competitive forces would prompt nations to adopt a single efficient 
governance form that is compatible with their existing institutional arrangements and 
economic development.  
 
Second, variables such as debt, diversification, intangible assets and industrial 
rent have some policy implications. They could be interpreted from various institutional 
perspectives. Positive interaction effects of excessive leverage and ownership structure 
towards performance will illustrate whether financial institutions could complement 
ownership structure in corporate governance or not. It is therefore, essential to address 
the policy of financial institutions on corporate governance, such as the appointment of 
representatives from financial institutions in firms where they provide loans or have 
direct investment. A negative result implies that financial institutions substitute the role 
of ownership structure in corporate governance. The substitution effects also imply that 
either financial institutions or ownership structure are redundant in the role of 
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monitoring the firm. An alternative explanation could be that financial institutions may 
not be an effective mechanism in corporate governance.  Therefore, corporate 
governance should focus on either one of the mechanisms.  
 
The issue of diversification is related to the policy on merger and acquisition as 
well as disclosure on self-dealing. Controlling owners pursue a diversification strategy 
to protect their interests, and this subsequently leads to a negative firm value. This 
implies that there are weaknesses in merger and acquisition regulations, regulation and 
disclosures on transaction between bidder and seller, and disclosure of the 
diversification. The managers or controlling owners could increase diversification 
through acquisitions that boost the chances of misallocation of capital, transfer pricing, 
insider trading and others.  Hence, a negative finding on the interaction relationship of 
ownership and diversification implies the weakness of these regulations.   
  
Lastly, industrial rent is crucial to the industrialization process of an economy. 
Although an industry with lower intensity of competition is significant at the initial level 
of a country’s industrialisation process, a higher level of industrial competition could 
also exert the role of monitoring and reinforcing the managers or controlling owners to 
enhance their performance. A lower level of industrial competition may reduce the 
effectiveness of regulation and other corporate governance mechanism instruments. 
Therefore, a negative finding on the interaction term between industry with a lower 
level of industrial competition and ownership structure suggests that emphasis should 
be placed on the industrial competition policy to further improve corporate governance. 
 
 
1.6 Limitations of the Study  
 
 Using an unbalanced sample of 256 firms from the Malaysian manufacturing 
sector over the period of 1994 –2000, the study endeavours to illustrate that managers 
and controlling owners enhance their private interest through excessive debt and 
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diversification, which could lead to the detriment of firm value.  This study has focused 
on the Malaysia manufacturing sector.  However, the issue of rent seeking is not 
confined to the manufacturing sector.  It is essential to compare and contrast the issues 
of ownership and private interest in other sectors. Other sectors which involve 
regulations and licensing from authority such as financial banking and insurance 
services or transportation services illustrate the possibility of rent value which could 
enhance controlling owners’ private interest.  However, the lack of industrial 
competition data from other sectors has precluded the possibility of comparing 
manufacturing sector and other sectors in this study.  
 
 Secondly, the main model of this study employs multiple regressions with 
interaction terms which encompass excessive leverage, multiple segment, highly 
intangible assets, and high industrial concentration. The dependent variable, applies 
the difference of firm value (Tobin’s Q) between year t and t-1, while the independent 
variable uses a lag year of t-1. Although, the study emphasises ex-ante alignment of 
managers, measured by their controlling interest and ex-post alignment such as 
diversification, the study could not accurately estimate the actual timing when 
managers or controlling owners use debt or diversification to enhance their private 
interest. In this perspective, the ownership variable is always a variable that is 
measured at a single point in time. However, other variables such as debt ratio, 
diversification and Tobin’s Q are flow variables during the reported financial year.   An 
ideal procedure is to obtain an average measure of ownership data in the same period. 
For instance, if one uses the yearly leverage ratio, ideally, it should be regressed 
against the average ownership for that year.  Unfortunately, there is not a single study 
that adopts this procedure.   
 
 Moreover, a variable like diversification is considered an ex-post alignment 
mechanism to the private interest of the controlling owner, but it could become an ex-
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ante determinant to the ownership in the subsequent year. This issue is not addressed 
in this study.  
 
Thirdly, it is assumed in this study that managerial ownership determines 
economic performance and not vice-versa. In other words, a direct approach, such as 
the  two- stage- least- square method (2SLS), is not applied to analyse whether there is 
a reverse effect from performance on ownership structure or not.  We are unable to 
address causality effects as the independent variables consist of non-linear and 
interaction terms. This causes an “identification problem” in a simultaneous equation.  
 
1.7 Outline of the Study 
 
The study is organised into six chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 
two outlines the salient features of the Malaysian institutional background. Focus is 
also given to the manufacturing sector from where the sample of this thesis is drawn 
from. The level of industrial competition where rent seeking could be derived from is put 
forth to enhance understanding. Besides, economic policies that result in financial rent 
which leads to excessive debt in the economy are also emphasized. The chapter then 
examines capital market development as well as financing patterns in the economy. It 
also outlines the issues of shareholders and the development of ownership structure 
under the New Economic Policy. The chapter highlights the issues of rent seeking in 
this economy which paves the way for the understanding of the background of 
institutions in this study.    
 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed analysis of the theories that explain ownership 
structure. The limitations of the agency theory to explain ownership structure and 
performance are emphasised. Hence, the chapter highlights the alternative theoretical 
framework in addressing corporate governance. The chapter proposes that transaction 
cost economics (TCE) and rent-seeking argument are two important assertions to be 
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included when addressing agency conflicts and performance.  The chapter continues to 
discuss the literature on the relationship between ownership structure and leverage, 
and ownership structure and diversification and its implications on firms’ value. These 
two issues are further discussed upon the conditionals of industrial competition and 
intangible assets with ownership structure.  Previous literature related to this study is 
also reviewed.  
 
 Chapter 4 introduces the hypotheses and methodology used. Three groups of 
hypotheses are formulated: ownership structure and leverage, ownership structure and 
diversification, and lastly the factors that determine the ownership structures.  The 
models used are discussed in the methodology section. The chapter also suggests the 
use of changes in the dependent variable, and lag year in the independent variables.   
The variables and their proxies used in the study as well as the sample selection are 
also discussed in this chapter.   
 
Chapter 5 presents the findings and discussion of the empirical investigation of 
the study. The first part of the findings provides the results and analysis of the 
regression involving ownership and leverage while the second part provides the 
findings involving ownership structure and diversification. The robustness tests 
controlling for firm size, year effects and alternative measurements are also provided. 
In addition, we also provide an alternative test based on productivity measurement. 
Lastly, findings on factors that determine ownership structures in this economy are also 
presented.    
 
The concluding chapter provides an overview of the implications of the study. 
Several policy implications on the corporate governance of financial institutions, the 
disclosure policy pertaining to diversification, the issue of industrial competition and 
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lastly the effectiveness of market information are presented. Finally, suggestions for 
future research are offered to end the chapter.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Malaysia Institutional Background 
  
2.1 Introduction 
 
The implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) since 1971 marks the 
watershed of the national socio- economic development in Malaysia. During the first 20 
years of the NEP, the economy grew at a rather impressive average rate of 6.7% per 
annum ( Malaysia, various years). The economy enjoyed a tremendous growth of 8.0% 
from 1990 to 1995, 8.6% in 1996, and 7.7% in 1997, before plunging  to -6.7% in 1998 
due to the financial crisis (Malaysia, 1999). Over the decades, due to the rapid changes 
in world economic growth as well as the pressure of deficit in public finance,  the 
government has taken steps to introduce some policy reforms in the Malaysian product 
and capital market. 
 
 The chapter proceeds with the explanation of industrial sector development.  
Particular attention is given to the manufacturing sector where rent seeking could 
prevail due to the low intensity of competition. Section 2.2 provides a brief background 
of the manufacturing sector in Malaysia. Financial structures and ownership structures 
are not mutually exclusive as both simultaneously affect each other. As specific 
literature on financing and ownership issues in the manufacturing sector is limited, we 
restrict our discussion to a general perspective of financial pattern and capital 
development to facilitate our understanding of the issues.  Section 2.3 discusses the 
Malaysian capital market. Section 2.4 shows the issues of financial rent created by the 
government and its implications on corporate governance. Section 2.5 deals with the 
formation of ownership structure in Malaysia. We highlight that ownership structure is 
linked to rent seeking created through the process of equity distribution. Section 2.6 
concludes the chapter.  
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2.2 Manufacturing Sector 
                                
In 1994, the manufacturing sector contributed 31.7% to the country’s GDP, after 
the services sector (Malaysia, 1994a). In fact, from 1994 to 2000, the contribution of 
the manufacturing sector to the GDP as well as its export exhibited an increasing trend 
(Table 2-1). The share of the average manufacturing sector  to the GDP was 35% for 
the period 1995 to 2000, while total export reached 85% in 2000.  The sector also 
provided an average of 27% of the total employment in the Malaysian labour market 
from 1996 to 2003. 
 
 In terms of value-added activities created, table 2-1 clearly indicates that the 
Malaysian manufacturing sector incorporated a higher intensity of technology as the 
value added increased from RM40 billion in 1995 to RM50 billion in 1997, before it was 
affected by the financial crisis.  Although there was an improvement in value added in 
2003, the share to total export had shown a reduction to 83.6% as the manufacturing 
sector growth rate was a low 6.5% as compared to 18.3% in 2000. In 2005, the growth 
rate and share to total export showed a slow improvement to 8.5% and 84%, 
respectively. The figures also clearly reflect that the manufacturing sector is vulnerable 
to external market volatility as it is largely export based and dependent on the import of 
capital input.    Besides, the sector also involves long vertical integration organizations 
from the input stage until the final product stage, which exposes it to various types of 
risks.  The manufacturing sector, as the locomotive engine of growth in the country, is 
the catalyst to the country’s economy. It also leads the different levels of the supply 
chain and other supporting industries. Therefore, a study on the impacts of ownership 
structure in the manufacturing sector is essential as it helps in policy formulation 
regarding capital allocation efficiency as well as ownership control. This would enhance 
diligent decision making and governance that would preserve the efficiency of firms.    
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Table 2- 1 Major indicators of the manufacturing sector 
Indicators     1995 1996 1997 1998 96-98 
99-
2000 2000 2003 2005 
Manufacturing Value 
Added 39,790 44,684 50,270 45,155 140,109 93,740 67,250 70,225 81,651 
(RM million in 1987 
prices)**          
Annual Growth Rate 
(%) 14.2 12.3 12.5 -10.2 4.3 3.4 18.3 6.5 8.5 
Share to GDP(%)  33.1 34.2 35.7 34.4 34.8   32 30.6 31.7 
Share to Total Export 
(%) 79.6 80.5 81 82.9 81.5 84.5 85.2 83 84 
Share to Total 
Employment 25.7 26.4 27.1 27 26.9 27.2 27.6 27.9 29.3 
** Year 1995-1998 was based on 1978 prices   
Source: 8th Malaysia Plan, 2001-2005, p202; Mid Term Review of the Seventh Malaysia Plan  
               1996-2000, p 196, Mid Term Review of the Eight Malaysia Plan 2001-2005, p202  
 
 
2.2.1 Industrial Policies 
 
The improvement in the manufacturing sector is largely due to the government’s 
Industrial Master Plan to transform Malaysia into an industrialised country. Since 1970, 
the state has successfully transformed the industrial policy from one of import 
substitution (phase 1-1957:1970) to export oriented (phase 2-1970:1980). The 
introduction of the heavy industrialisation policy plan in the 1980s (phase 3-1980-1985) 
drove the Malaysian industries to invest in expensive foreign technology, which  also 
led to large amounts of government borrowings. During the later stage of the export-
oriented strategy (Phase 4-1980:1990s), the manufacturing sector was well diversified 
in both resource based and non-resource based sectors (Malaysia Industry of Trade 
and Investment, 1994). The second Industrial Master Plan was later implemented, in 
accordance with the Seventh and Eighth Malaysian Plans (1996-2005).  
 
The underlying argument for the industrial policy implemented in Malaysia is 
fundamentally based on the “infant industry” argument (see Jomo, Felker and Rasiah, 
1999; Alavi, 1996). Therefore, various types of tax incentives, subsidies and trade 
protections have been introduced to promote and protect those industries until such 
time the industries become internationally competitive. However, the policy attracts 
criticism in terms of protection given to the domestic market as well as the time to 
